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Abstract
Variation in political ideology has been linked to differences in attention to and pro-
cessing of emotional stimuli, with stronger responses to negative versus positive 
stimuli (negativity bias) the more politically conservative one is. As memory is en-
hanced by attention, such findings predict that memory for negative versus posi-
tive stimuli should similarly be enhanced the more conservative one is. The pres-
ent study tests this prediction by having participants study 120 positive, negative, 
and neutral scenes in preparation for a subsequent memory test. On the memory 
test, the same 120 scenes were presented along with 120 new scenes and partic-
ipants were to respond whether a scene was old or new. Results on the memory 
test showed that negative scenes were more likely to be remembered than positive 
scenes, though, this was true only for political conservatives. That is, a larger neg-
ativity bias was found the more conservative one was. The effect was sizeable, ex-
plaining 45% of the variance across subjects in the effect of emotion. These find-
ings demonstrate that the relationship between political ideology and asymmetries 
in emotion processing extend to memory and, furthermore, suggest that explor-
ing the extent to which subject variation in interactions among emotion, attention, 
and memory is predicted by conservatism may provide new insights into theories 
of political ideology.  
Keywords: Emotion, Memory, Negativity bias, Political ideology, Multilevel modeling 
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Emotion modulates several cognitive processes, including perception, 
attention, decision making, and memory (see Ref. [19], for review). 
For example, relative to neutral stimuli, emotional stimuli are asso-
ciated with enhanced contrast sensitivity in early vision [27], are de-
tected faster and more accurately in a field of distractors [11], and are 
more likely to be attended [6] and remembered [16]. Not all emotional 
stimuli are equivalent in their effects on cognition, however. Often, 
large asymmetries can be observed in the effects of different emotions. 
In particular, a well-established finding is negativity bias—on average, 
individuals are attuned more to generally negative versus generally 
positive stimuli [1]. The present study is concerned with the variation 
around this “average”. Some individuals respond strongly to negative 
stimuli (e.g., those with high anxiety); others less so (e.g., those with 
less anxiety). Likewise, some negative stimuli strongly affect cogni-
tive processes (e.g., snakes and spiders); others less so (e.g., road kill). 
Here, we use crossed random effect modeling to investigate simulta-
neously the extent to which subject variation in the effect of emotional 
scene content on declarative memory is explained by political ideol-
ogy, as well as the extent to which scene variation in the effect of po-
litical ideology on memory is explained by emotion-related variables. 
Previous work has shown that political ideology is associated with 
attentional asymmetries in the processing of emotionally valenced 
stimuli [4,22,31]. Carraro et al. [4] (Experiment 1) used an emotional 
Stroop task and found that, relative to liberals, conservatives re-
sponded more slowly to negative words, suggesting that negative in-
formation automatically captured the attention of conservatives. In a 
second experiment using a dot-probe task, conservatives were more 
likely to direct their attention toward spatial locations at which neg-
ative information was presented [4]; (Experiment 2), suggesting that 
the likelihood of attending negative scene content also correlates pos-
itively with conservatism. Similar findings have been reported across 
different tasks, stimuli, and measures. Dodd et al. [8] recorded eye 
movements during a free-view task in which participants viewed col-
lages of positive and negative scenes and found that speeded fixation 
of and prolonged dwell time on negative versus positive scenes each 
correlated positively with conservatism, suggesting that eye move-
ments were selectively biased toward negative stimuli as a function 
of political ideology. Mills et al. [22] recorded both behavioral and 
eye movement responses during a visual search task for happy and 
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angry faces and found a positive correlation between anger-superi-
ority (speeded detection of angry versus happy faces, as measured by 
behavioral response times) and conservatism. In contrast to Carraro 
et al. [4] (Experiment 1), however, this speed advantage was not due 
to attention capture but rather to post-selectional processes. Specif-
ically, Mills et al. showed that all individuals were equally quick to 
fixate angry faces but whereas liberals tended to make additional eye 
movements before manually responding to the presence of an angry 
face, conservatives did not, suggesting their response time advantage 
was due to speeded response selection rather than attention capture. 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that political ideology 
is associated with attentional asymmetries in the processing of emo-
tionally valenced stimuli, with conservatives being more vigilant to-
ward negative stimuli. As attention is known to enhance memory 
[21], these findings lead to the prediction that the effect of emotional 
valence on memory should vary with political ideology in a similar 
manner. Some evidence for this comes from Shook and Fazio [31], in 
which an asymmetry in reward-based learning of novel objects was 
found to vary with political ideology such that superior learning of 
negatively valenced information (objects paired with a monetary loss) 
correlated positively with conservatism. This might suggest that con-
servatives remembered negative objects better than positive objects, 
though, it should be noted that they were also more likely to misre-
member positive objects (objects paired with a monetary gain) as be-
ing negative. In other words, this finding may reflect a simple bias to 
respond that an object is “negative”, as opposed to being solely driven 
by memory. Therefore, to test whether memory for emotionally va-
lenced stimuli varies with political ideology, the present study had 
participants study 120 positive, negative, and neutral scenes in prep-
aration for a memory test. On the memory test, participants viewed 
240 scenes, half of which were the studied scenes and half of which 
were novel. For each scene, participants indicated whether or not it 
had been studied. Given the pattern of attentional asymmetry and 
the general enhancing effect of attention on memory, we expect su-
perior memory for negative versus positive scenes (negativity bias) 
to be enhanced the more conservative one is. Moreover, political ide-
ology should explain a substantial portion of the variability in nega-
tivity bias across subjects. 
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1. Method 
1.1. Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduates from the University of Nebraska– Lincoln 
participated in exchange for course credit. All participants had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve to the purpose of the 
study, and were informed of their rights of participation according to 
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln institutional review board. 
1.2. Measures 
Political ideology was measured using the Wilson-Patterson Inven-
tory [35], which asked participants to indicate the degree to which 
they agreed or disagreed with 20 “hot-button” issues (e.g., abortion). 
On the basis of these responses, participants received a score indi-
cating the extent to which they held liberal or conservative positions 
(see Appendix A for items and scoring). Scores ranged from −29 to 
+28 (M = 0.58, SD = 11.87), where more positive scores reflect a more 
conservative ideology. In addition to the Wilson-Patterson Inventory, 
participants also indicated their self-reported political identification 
(5-point Likert scale, where 1 = liberal, 2 = moderate, leaning lib-
eral, 3 = moderate, 4 = moderate, leaning conservative, and 5 = con-
servative) and their self-reported party identification (7-point Likert 
scale, where 1 = strong Democrat, 2 = weak Democrat, 3 = Indepen-
dent, leaning Democrat, 4 = Independent, 5 = Independent, leaning 
Republican, 6 = weak Republican, and 7 = strong Republican). Wil-
son-Patterson scores correlated significantly with self-reported polit-
ical identification, r = 0.61, p < 0.001, and self-reported party identi-
fication, r = 0.58, p < 0.001. 
1.3. Stimuli 
Stimuli were 240 full-color scenes (640 × 480 pixels) sampled from 
the Geneva Affective Picture Database (GAPED; [7]. GAPED contains 
730 real-world scenes nested within three general scene content cat-
egories (positive, negative, and neutral) and pre-rated on dimensions 
of valence and arousal. Of these, we randomly selected 80 positive 
and 80 neutral scenes. Positive scenes depicted mostly baby humans, 
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baby animals, and landscapes. Neutral scenes depicted mostly interior 
scenes and furniture, as well some less common objects such as an ex-
tension cord and analog antenna. GAPED additionally distinguishes be-
tween four subcategories of negative scenes: snakes, spiders, human 
concerns (scenes depicting human rights violations), and animal con-
cerns (scenes depicting animal mistreatment). We randomly selected 
10 snakes, 10 spiders, 30 human concerns, and 30 animal concerns, 
for a total of 80 negative scenes. Descriptive statistics for the selected 
sample of scenes are presented on Table 1. Example scene stimuli are 
shown in Fig. 1. Scenes were displayed on a Pentium IV computer with 
a 17” monitor (60 Hz) within individual testing suites equipped with 
soft lighting and sound attenuation. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the present sample of scenes.
Category  N                        Valence         Arousal
  M  SD  Range  M  SD  Range
Negative  80  10.0  5.6  1–25  74.3  6.1  65–92
Animal (legal norm violations)  30  7.9  3.9  1–13  74.8  5.5  67–89
Human (moral norm violations)  30  8.0  4.8  1–16  76.2  7.0  65–92
Snake  10  19.6  2.7  16–25  68.0 1.5  66–70
Spider  10  13.0  2.7  10–19  73.5  2.9  70–79
Neutral  80  55.0  5.3  41–66  24.1  6.8  10–42
Positive  80  92.9  3.0  87–99  19.1  8.1  6–43
Fig. 1. Example scene stimuli for the positive and neutral scene categories, as well 
as for the animal, human, and threat subtypes within the negative scene category. 
Note that scenes were presented in full color during the experiment. 
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1.4. Procedure 
Participants first completed a study phase and then a test phase. In 
the study phase, participants viewed 144 scenes in preparation for 
a memory test. Each trial began with a central fixation cross, which 
was replaced after 1000 ms by a to-be-studied scene. Scenes were pre-
sented for 2000 ms and were followed immediately by the next trial. 
To control for serial position effects (primacy and recency), the first 
and last 12 scenes served as buffers and were excluded from the test-
ing phase. Buffer stimuli were neutral scenes selected from the Inter-
national Affective Picture Database [18]. The study phase lasted ~7 
min and was followed immediately by instructions for the test phase. 
As these instructions were quite simple, the interval between study 
and test was no more than 1–2 min. 
In the test phase, participants viewed 240 scenes, half of which 
were presented during the study phase and half of which were novel. 
Each trial began with a central fixation cross for 1000 ms, followed 
by a test scene, which was present until a response was entered. Par-
ticipants were to press the ‘f’ key if a scene had been studied or the ‘j’ 
key if a scene had not been studied. To ensure that participants were 
not responding indiscriminately, 8 catch trials were included. Catch 
stimuli were “fake” scenes depicting animal caricatures (e.g., buck-
toothed shark, squirrel holding a gun) downloaded from the inter-
net. Participants were instructed to withhold their response to these 
scenes. Catch stimuli were displayed for 5000 ms or until an errone-
ous response was entered. Questionnaires were completed following 
the test phase. In total, sessions lasted ~45 min. 
2. Results and discussion 
Four participants were excluded from analysis for responding erro-
neously on all or all but one of the catch trials. Of the remaining sub-
jects, 7 responded on 1–2 catch trials and 3 responded on 3 catch 
trials; all others successfully withheld their response on all 8 catch 
trials. Trials with response times <250 ms (0.003%) or >5000 ms 
(0.012%) were also excluded from analysis. The left panel of Fig. 2 
shows the mean proportion of correct responses for positive, nega-
tive, and neutral scene categories as a function of ideology. As can be 
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seen, memory appears to be enhanced for the negative versus posi-
tive category. Moreover, this bias appears to be larger at higher lev-
els of conservatism (Fig. 2, middle panel). 
2.1. Effect of scene category 
To confirm these observations statistically, as in previous studies, we 
computed subject mean proportion of correct responses for each scene 
category and submitted them to a mixed analysis of variance with cat-
egory (positive, negative, neutral) as a within-subject factor and po-
litical ideology (centered at 0, reflecting a political moderate) as a 
between-subject covariate. There was a significant main effect of cat-
egory, F(2, 116) = 22.55, p < 0.001, such that the proportion of correct 
responses was higher for negative (M = 0.84) than for positive (M = 
0.78), t(116) = −6.65, p < 0.001, and neutral categories (M = 0.80), 
t(116) = −4.10, p < 0.001. Thus, on average, memory was superior for 
the negative category. The main effect of ideology was not significant, 
F < 1, indicating that, on average, memory did not differ between lib-
erals and conservatives. Critically, there was a significant category 
by ideology interaction, F(2, 116) = 3.72, p = 0.03, such that superior 
memory for negative versus positive categories was positively asso-
ciated with conservatism, t(116) = −3.04, p = 0.003. Thus, the antici-
pated negativity bias (enhanced processing of negative versus positive 
Fig. 2. Left panel: mean proportion of correct responses as a function of political 
ideology (higher values reflect a more conservative ideology) for positive (Pos), 
negative (Neg), and neutral (Neu) scene categories. Middle panel: mean negativ-
ity bias (negative minus positive) as a function of political ideology (black line). A 
reference line for the 0 location (i.e., no difference in proportion correct between 
negative and positive scene categories) is also included (dashed gray line). Right 
panel: mean response time (RT) in milliseconds as a function of political ideol-
ogy for positive, negative, and neutral scene categories. Error bars represent +/− 
1 standard error. 
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stimuli) was larger the more conservative one was.1 Although this re-
sult provides evidence that the relationship between political ideol-
ogy and negativity bias extends to memory, it is uninformative in one 
key way: it does not quantify the extent to which political ideology ex-
plained differences in negativity bias across subjects. This is because 
the critical interaction was tested against a within-subject error term. 
If negativity bias differs between subjects as a function of ideology, 
then the critical interaction needs be tested against a between-sub-
ject error term, specifically, a residual for subject variation in nega-
tivity bias. Otherwise, the between-subject variation in negativity bias 
that political ideology is hypothesized to predict is confounded with 
within-subject variation.  
In order for political ideology to predict subject variation in nega-
tivity bias, the ideal analysis would need to model all relevant sources 
of variation simultaneously. Moreover, given that accuracy is a binary 
outcome (correct/incorrect), the ideal analysis would need to trans-
form the outcome onto a scale that it is not bounded by 0 and 1. Fi-
nally, given that the valence of a scene varies not only between cate-
gories but also within a category (Table 1), the ideal analysis would 
need to analyze the effect of scene valence continuously (as opposed 
to categorically) in order to capture this variability. To that end, a 
generalized linear mixed model was used to predict variability across 
subjects and scenes in logit-transformed probability of correct rec-
ognition, p(correct), for 240 scenes and 60 subjects as a function of 
scene valence (centered at 0, reflecting a negatively valenced scene), 
subject ideology (centered at 0, reflecting a politically moderate in-
dividual), and their interaction. To account for this sampling struc-
ture, crossed random effects modeling was used to explicitly represent 
each source of variation simultaneously [13]. In the present design, 
1. We also analyzed the data in terms of d’. The results were identical, with the exception that 
superior memory for negative versus neutral scenes also correlated positively with conser-
vatism. There was a significant main effect of category, F(2, 116) = 10.75, p < 0.001. Sensi-
tivity was significantly greater for the negative category than the positive, t(116) = 4.64, p 
< 0.001, and neutral, t(116) = 2.31, p = 0.02, categories. Sensitivity was also significantly 
greater for the neutral versus positive category, t(116) = −2.33, p = 0.02. The main effect 
of ideology was not significant, F(1, 58) = .55, p = 0.46. Importantly, there was a signifi-
cant category by ideology interaction, F(2, 116) = 5.46, p = 0.01, such that greater sensitiv-
ity for the negative versus positive category was enhanced for more conservative individ-
uals, t(116) = 4.87, p < 0.001. Greater sensitivity for the negative versus neutral category 
was also enhanced for more conservative individuals, t(116) = 2.20, p = 0.03. Greater sen-
sitivity for the neutral versus positive category did not vary significantly with ideology, 
t(116) = −1.04, p = 0.30.   
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this included variation across subjects, scenes, and their interaction. 
Critically, crossed models allow subjects to differ in their effects of 
scene predictors (valence) via random slope variances, which affords 
the ability to evaluate the extent to which subject characteristics (po-
litical ideology) explain this source of subject variation (i.e., differ-
ences between subjects in the effect of valence). 
2.2. Effect of scene valence 
To examine the extent to which political ideology predicts subject vari-
ation in the effect of scene valence, we began by estimating a series 
of empty means models (i.e., models without predictors) in order to 
decompose the total variation in the outcome, p(correct). Relative to 
a model specifying a single residual variance, there was significant 
variability in mean p(correct) across subjects, −2ΔLL(~1) = 1142, p 
< 0.001, and across scenes, −2ΔLL(~1) = 4329, p < 0.001, such that 
15% of the total variation was due to mean differences across subjects, 
48% to mean differences across scenes, and the remaining 37% to the 
subject by scene interaction. Sequential models were then tested to 
examine the main effects of scene valence and subject ideology (de-
scribed below). To quantify how much of the total between-scene and 
between-subject variation in mean p(correct) was explained by scene 
valence and subject ideology, respectively, we calculated pseudo-R2 
statistics, which express the proportion of variance reduced in a given 
variance component after inclusion of a relevant fixed effect. Accord-
ingly, the main effect of scene valence explained 1.48% of the total 
between-scene variation and the main effect of subject ideology ex-
plained 0.95% of the total between-subject variation. 
Subject differences in the effect of scene valence on p(correct) 
were then examined. The effect of scene valence varied significantly 
over subjects, −2ΔLL(~1) = 10.6, p = 0.001. An interaction term to as-
sess moderation of the effect of scene valence by subject ideology was 
then added to the model. Model 1 on Table 2 provides the estimates 
obtained from the final model, which can be interpreted as follows. 
The intercept of 1.9960 is the expected mean p(correct) specifically 
for a subject with ideology = 0 (politically moderate) to a scene with 
valence = 0 (negative valence). The effect of scene valence indicates 
that, for a subject with ideology = 0, p(correct) is expected to be non-
significantly lower by −0.0035 for every one-unit more positively va-
lenced a scene is. The effect of subject ideology indicates that, for a 
Mills  et  al .  in  Behavioural  Bra in  Research 306  (2016)      10
scene with valence = 0, p(correct) is expected to be non-significantly 
higher by 0.0101 for every one-unit more conservative one is. Criti-
cally, the significant scene valence by subject ideology interaction in-
dicates that the effect of valence was enhanced by −0.0002 for every 
one-unit more conservative one is. In other words, superior mem-
ory for negatively valenced scenes (negativity bias) correlated posi-
tively with political conservatism. The effect was sizeable, explaining 
45.16% of subject variation. 
For comparison, we estimated the same model but used arousal 
ratings to predict memory performance rather than valence ratings 
(see Model 2 on Table 2 for parameter estimates). Given that valence 
and arousal ratings were strongly correlated (r = −0.89, p < 0.001; 
variance inflation index = 4.81), the critical finding was the same 
(i.e., superior memory for more arousing scenes correlated positively 
with conservatism). However, whereas political ideology explained 
45.16% of subject variation in the effect valence, it explained 35.48% 
of subject variation in the effect of arousal, indicating that the valence 
model has greater explanatory power. Consistent with this finding, 
inspection of the valence and arousal rating distributions for neutral 
and positive scenes (Table 1) shows that positive scenes were rated 
as more positively valenced but not more arousing (in fact, on aver-
age, neutral scenes were slightly more arousing). As memory was sig-
nificantly better for neutral versus positive scenes (evident by sig-
nificant effects of valence at higher levels of conservatism; Model 1 
on Table 2), the arousal model thus incorrectly predicts that mem-
ory should be equivalent for these scenes. Taken together, these find-
ings suggest that negativity bias offers a more complete account of 
Table 2. Parameter estimates (Est), standard errors (SE), p-values, and pseudo R2 values 
for the valence (model 1) and arousal models (model 2).
Model  Parameter Est  SE  p  R2
1  Intercept  1.99602  .17151  <0.01
 Valence (0 = negative)  −0.00347  .00233  .14  1.48%
 Ideology (0 = moderate)  .01005  .00800  .21  0.95%
 Valence × Ideology  −0.00019  .00007  .01  45.16%
2  Intercept  1.61316  .15616  <0.01
 Arousal (0 = low)  .00621  .00310  .05  2.05%
 Ideology (0 = moderate)  −0.00704  .00745  .35  0.95%
 Arousal × Ideology  .00024  .00009  .01  35.48%
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the data. Speed-accuracy tradeoff? To assess whether the larger nega-
tivity bias in conservatives was attributable to a speed-accuracy trad-
eoff, response time to correct recognition was examined as a function 
of scene valence and subject ideology (Fig. 2, right panel). There was 
a significant main effect of valence (Estimate = 96.66, SE = 9.17, p < 
0.001) such that responses were faster for more positively valenced 
scenes. However, neither the main effect of ideology nor its interac-
tion with valence were significant (ps > 0.66), indicating that effects 
of ideology were not due to a speed-accuracy tradeoff.  
2.3. Effects of negativity subtypes 
So far, we have shown that emotional memory varies with political 
ideology such that superior memory for negatively valenced scenes 
is enhanced in more conservative individuals. The notion here is that 
scene valence accounts for this asymmetry. There are alternative pos-
sibilities, however. One is intensity bias (i.e., the tendency to respond 
more strongly to highly arousing scenes, regardless of scene valence; 
[32, 33]. As described above, we cannot definitively rule out this ac-
count, though, we have reported evidence that it provides a less com-
plete account of the present data. Another possibility is that rather 
than reflecting an attunement to generally negative or generally arous-
ing stimuli, the relationship between political ideology and responses 
to emotional scenes reflects a more narrowly tuned bias to a partic-
ular subtype of negative or arousing stimuli, specifically, biological 
threat [20, 22]. 
To investigate this issue, we examined memory for three subtypes 
of scenes within the negative scene category. The first subtype (threat) 
consisted of snakes and spiders, stimuli which have been used exten-
sively in previous work and which are commonly assumed to be of 
high relevance on account of their biological and evolutionary threat-
related content. The second subtype (animal) contained scenes de-
picting animal mistreatment. The third subtype (human) contained 
scenes depicting human rights violations. If political conservatism is 
characterized by stronger responses to broadly negative [4, 8, 12, 31] 
or broadly arousing [33] stimuli, then memory for different kinds of 
negative and arousing stimuli (threat, animal, or human) should not 
vary in their relationship with political ideology. On the other hand, 
if conservatism is characterized by a more specific biological threat 
bias [20, 22], then the relationship between ideology and memory for 
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biologically threatening scenes should differ from the relationship be-
tween ideology and memory for animal or human scenes. 
Fig. 3 shows the mean proportion of correct responses as a func-
tion of political ideology (centered at 0, reflecting a political moder-
ate) for the threat, animal, and human subtypes (effect coded) within 
the negative scene category. There was a significant main effect of 
subtype, F(2, 78.4) = 11.55, p < 0.001. Relative to threat, memory was 
significantly better for animal, t(74.6) = 3.58, p < 0.001, and human 
subtypes, t(78.4) = 4.97, p < 0.001. The difference between animal 
and human subtypes was not significant, t(83.5) = −1.02, p = 0.31. 
The main effect of ideology was marginally significant, F(1, 69.5) = 
3.61, p = 0.06. Importantly, the subtype by ideology interaction was 
not significant, F < 1, indicating that there were no significant differ-
ences among subtypes of the negative scene category in their relation-
ship with political ideology. Thus, the positive relations between con-
servatism and memory for negative stimuli extended beyond overtly 
threatening images (snakes and spiders) and into those that are more 
broadly negative (animal and human subtypes of negativity, which 
depict legal and moral norm violations, respectively).2 This suggests 
that negativity bias, not specifically threat bias, underlies differences 
in political temperament. 
Fig. 3. Mean probability of correct recognition, p(correct), as a function of polit-
ical ideology (higher values reflect a more conservative ideology) for threat, ani-
mal, and human subtypes within the negative scene category. Error bars represent 
+/−1 standard error.  
2. These data were also analyzed in terms of d’. The results were the same except that the 
overall difference in sensitivity between animal and human subtypes was now significant. 
There was a main effect of subtype, F(2, 116) = 59.95, p < 0.001. Sensitivity was significantly 
greater for the human subtype relative to the animal, t(116) = 2.50, p = 0.02, and threat sub-
types, t(116) = 10.52, p < 0.001. Sensitivity was also significantly greater for the animal ver-
sus threat subtype, t(116) = 8.02, p < 0.001. The main effect of political ideology was mar-
ginally significant, F(1, 58) = 2.83, p = 0.09. The interaction was not significant, F < 1.   
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3. General discussion 
We have shown that political ideology significantly affects emotional 
memory, providing evidence that emotional scene content biases mem-
ory asymmetrically as function of political ideology. Specifically, we 
found that political conservatism correlated positively with supe-
rior memory for negative versus positive scenes. Thus, associations 
between ideology and emotional processing biases extend to mem-
ory. Importantly, this relationship was sizeable, accounting for 45% 
of the total subject variation. Taken together, these findings provide 
compelling evidence that individual differences in emotional process-
ing underlie higher-level processes involved in political preference 
formation. 
A currently debated issue relates to the affective component of po-
litical ideology responsible for emotional bias. One possibility is that 
scene valence underlies emotion processing biases [4, 8, 12, 31]. Lib-
erals and conservatives differ on several broad personality traits and 
social orientations such as openness to new experiences and con-
scientiousness [3, 14], tolerance of social equality and change [15], 
moral foundations [9], internal values [29], and perceptions of hu-
man nature [26]. Recent proposals suggest that a major factor un-
derlying these differences is one’s orientation to negatively valenced 
stimuli [12]. According to this account, negativity bias (tendency to 
respond more strongly to negatively valenced stimuli) varies widely 
across individuals. These variations, in turn, encourage particular so-
cial tendencies and political beliefs. Negativity bias is known to vary 
greatly across individuals [24] and has been found to manifest itself 
in broad social orientations such as risk tolerance [1]. Thus, the neg-
ativity bias account proposes that variations in negativity bias shape 
not only broad social orientations but also the nature of political be-
liefs. Consistent with this proposal, the present study found that polit-
ical ideology explained 45% of subject variation in the effect of scene 
valence on memory.   
From an evolutionary perspective, negativity bias may be adaptive 
in at least two respects. First, enhanced memory for negative stimuli 
and events may facilitate memory for the source, location, and con-
sequence of items and events that should be engaged and resolved 
(e.g., violations of normative standards) or avoided (e.g., threats to 
health such as disease). Second, to the extent that negativity bias fa-
cilitates engagement and resolution of negative content, negativity 
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bias may indirectly foster more positive views of life. This could ex-
plain the finding that conservatives report greater happiness than lib-
erals [23]; but see Ref. [36]. In this regard, it may be more precise to 
characterize the present and previous findings as a deficit in negativ-
ity bias the more liberal one is, as opposed to an enhanced negativity 
bias the more conservative one is. 
Another possibility is that variation in arousal underlies emotion 
processing biases [33]. It is well-known that emotional arousal has 
an enhancing effect on memory [10, 17]; see Ref. [30], for a review). 
Given that the present stimulus set was strongly correlated on dimen-
sional ratings of valence and arousal, this account may also explain the 
present results. Tritt et al. [32] offer two possibilities for why arousal 
may promote conservative orientations. One is that arousal interferes 
with cognitive ability, which causes a preference for intuitive “gut-
level” ideas (an umbrella under which conservative ideas presumably 
fall). Since the claim that interference with cognition causes a pref-
erence for ideas that do not rely on cognition is merely a restatement 
of an empirical phenomenon in theoretical terms, it must be true by 
definition. Staying within this level of theorization is economical but 
not instructive. A natural next step is to weigh the relative plausibil-
ity of alternative sources of emotion processing asymmetries. 
The second possibility they suggest is that arousal might motivate 
individuals to endorse value systems that promote social structures 
geared toward minimizing the potential for intense arousal. There are 
two problems with this proposal. First, it presupposes that (a) indi-
viduals are aware of the items and events instigating intense arousal 
(otherwise they could not endorse values aimed at removing them) 
and, (b) endorsement of value systems minimize the potential for such 
events. Both of these are questionable assumptions given that individ-
uals routinely misattribute sources of arousal [28] and that endorse-
ment of a value system (e.g., anti-immigration) cannot reliably mini-
mize the arousal induced by immigration-related cues (e.g., endorsing 
anti-immigration policies cannot minimize the arousal induced by see-
ing someone who looks like an immigrant), rendering the utility of 
such a mechanism dubious. Second, as mentioned above, arousal tends 
to benefit cognition, so why would it be desirable to minimize it? Al-
though Tritt et al. recognized that activation of arousal systems is fre-
quently beneficial, they cite two studies showing that intense arousal 
can be experienced as aversive, as well as a study showing that intense 
arousal is associated with mania and impulsivity. Thus, according to 
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this account, conservatives respond so intensely to emotional events 
that their cognitions become pathological and debilitating, thereby 
motivating the endorsement of values that minimize those events. As-
sociating conservatism with psychopathology notwithstanding, the 
problem with this is that the level of arousal leading to liberal-conser-
vative differences in cognition has yet to be shown to be debilitating. 
In fact, the present study, as well as all others showing correlations 
between political ideology and emotion processing asymmetries, have 
uniformly showed that emotion benefits cognition more for conser-
vatives than liberals. Biased processing of and memory for negative 
stimuli is adaptive—it prevents organisms from harm. True, it may be 
maladaptive in cases of psychopathology, but only through convoluted 
argument can conservatism be related to psychopathology. 
In sum, our results show that negatively valenced emotional stim-
uli appear to have a more privileged status in memory the more con-
servative one is. Although the present study cannot distinguish be-
tween valence and arousal accounts, the relevant contribution it makes 
to theories of political ideology is that emotional memory plays role 
in the development of political ideology. This, in turn, provides new 
avenues for investigating how variation in emotion processing shape 
broad social orientations in general and political ideology in particu-
lar. An important issue for future work to address is the locus of the 
ideology by emotion interaction effect on memory in the course of in-
formation processing. One possibility is that individual variation in 
encoding processes (attention and elaboration) give rise to individual 
differences in emotional memory. As noted in the introduction, sev-
eral studies have demonstrated that attentional biases to emotional 
stimuli differ between individuals. Although the exact components 
of attention (engagement, shifting, disengagement) on which indi-
viduals differ await systematic investigation, there is some evidence 
implicating attentional engagement [22]. In a present/absent search 
task for happy and angry faces, Mills et al. [22] reported eye tracking 
data showing that once an angry face had been fixated, conservatives 
responded to its presence immediately, prior to making even a sin-
gle additional eye movement. Liberals, in contrast, tended to make at 
least one additional eye movement. These data suggest that conserva-
tives engaged and responded to threat. Another possibility is that in-
dividual variation in post-encoding processes (consolidation and cor-
tisol release) give rise to individual differences in emotional memory. 
As consolidation is a process that unfolds over time, investigation of 
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this possibility will require future studies to manipulate the amount 
of time allowed for consolidation. If individual variation in consoli-
dation gives rise to individual differences in emotional memory, then 
observed effects of emotion on memory should increase with time. 
As emotion modulates several cognitive processes, including per-
ception, attention, decision making, and memory, it plays an impor-
tant role in how individuals perceive and construe their environment, 
how they make judgments, and what they will remember. Individual 
differences in the effect of emotion on cognition, in turn, likely under-
lie higher-level processes such as attitude formation [5, 31] and the 
development of political ideology [12]. The present finding that politi-
cal conservatism is positively correlated with negativity bias in mem-
ory, along with previous findings showing the same correlation in at-
tention, suggest that these two fundamental processes of intellectual 
function are intimately involved in shaping higher-level processes.     
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Appendix A.
Wilson-Patterson items and scoring procedure The Wilson-Patterson Inventory is a twenty-item 
battery containing 10 conservative (C) items and 10 liberal (L) items. Positive responses to con-
servative items were assigned a positive value; negative responses a negative value (strongly 
disagree = −2, disagree = −1, uncertain = 0, agree = 1, strongly agree = 2). Conversely, posi-
tive responses to liberal items were assigned a negative value; negative responses a positive 
value (strongly disagree = 2, disagree = 1, uncertain = 0, agree = −1, strongly agree = −2). Re-
sponses to all items were then summed. In this scheme, more positive values reflect a more 
conservative ideology.
Item  Strongly  Disagree Uncertain Agree  Strongly 
 disagree     agree
School prayer (C)  m  m  m  m  m
Pacifism (L)  m  m  m  m  m
Stop illegal immigration (C)  m  m  m  m  m
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Government-arranged healthcare (L) m m m m m
Premarital sex (L) m m m m m
Gay marriage (L) m m m m m
Abortion rights (L) m m m m m
Evolution (L) m m m m m
Biblical truth (C) m m m m m
Increase welfare spending (L) m m m m m
Protect gun rights (C) m m m m m
Increase military spending (C) m m m m m
Government regulation of business (L) m m m m m
Small government (C) m m m m m
Foreign aid (L) m m m m m
Lower taxes (C) m m m m m
Stem cell research (L) m m m m m
Abstinence-only sex education (C) m m m m m
Allow torture of terrorism suspects (C) m m m m m
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